Needing the other: the anatomy of the Mass Noun Thesis by Lajos Brons




Needing the other: the anatomy 
of the Mass Noun Thesis
Lajos BRONS∗
ABSTRACT
Othering is the construction and identification of the self or in-group and the other or out-
group in mutual, unequal opposition by attributing relative inferiority and/or radical alienness 
to the other/out-group. Othering can be “crude” or “sophisticated”, the defining difference 
being that in the latter case othering depends on the interpretation of the other/out-group in 
terms that are applicable only to the self/in-group but that are unconsciously assumed to be 
universal. The Mass Noun Thesis, the idea that all nouns in certain languages are grammatically 
and folk-ontologically similar to mass nouns in English, is an example of sophisticated othering. 
According to this Thesis, (a) count nouns refer to discrete objects and mass nouns to stuff; 
(b) the other’s language has only mass nouns and thus no count nouns; and therefore, (c) the 
other’s folk-ontology is an ontology of mass stuffs only. There is much evidence, however, that 
folk-ontology is independent from language. This paper argues that the Mass Noun Thesis is 
a case of sophisticated othering rooted in a conflation of grammatical and ontological concep-
tions of mass and count nouns that is applicable to the language of the interpreter/self but not 
to the languages of the relevant others, and that othering in this case is driven by a need to create 
some radically alien other to support a scientific or philosophical theory.
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While we supposedly have direct access to our own minds, our understanding of 
others is based on considerably less reliable sources. Whether in our daily lives 
or in scientific contexts, interpreting others is a precarious undertaking with 
ample opportunity for failure. Among the failures of interpretation, “othering” 
is one of the most malignant: it is not just a misinterpretation of the other, but 
a self-serving stigmatization of that other through misinterpretation. In its crud-
est form, othering is the attribution of some undesirable characteristic to the 
other or out-group leading to the usually implicit conclusion that that other/
out-group is (in some sense) inferior and/or radically alien. Othering thus cre-
ates a boundary between the in-group and the other/out-group, “justifying” 
exclusion, discrimination and/or subjection. The history of Western attitudes 
towards other peoples is littered with examples of othering, the Orientalist 
myths of the mystical and/or less rational East being one of the better known 
examples.
The humanities and social sciences occupy themselves with the interpretation 
of the past and present actions and writings of others, and there is little reason to 
assume that these fields are immune from the kinds of errors we make in our or-
dinary, daily interpretation of others. Nevertheless, othering is generally treated 
in these fields (if at all) as something other people do, not as  something scientists 
might do. (MacQuarrie, 2010, is a notable exception.) However, Orien talism 
was (and is) at least as much a product of the early humanities and social sci-
ences as of popular imagination (Said, 1978), and ethnography in particular has 
a trouble some history of drawing boundaries between lesser others/out-groups 
and superior selves/in-groups (e.g., Vidich & Lyman, 1994). Furthermore, other-
ing in the social sciences and humanities is not just a bad phase in the history of 
science that we have now passed — it remains a threat. Even if the crudest forms 
of othering such as the Orientalist myths and similar sexist myths about suppos-
edly less rational women have now become less common (or less acceptable at 
least), there are more sophisticated forms of othering that are less easily exposed 
and disposed off. In this paper, I will argue that the Mass Noun Thesis, the idea 
that all nouns in certain languages are grammatically and folk-ontologically 
similar to mass nouns in English, is a contemporary example of such “sophisti-
cated othering”.
Sections 2 and 3 of this paper will introduce the logical forms of othering 
and the Mass Noun Thesis respectively. Sections 4 to 6 will analyse the argu-
ment, evidence, and motivation for the Mass Noun Thesis. The main claims 
of this paper are that folk-ontology is independent from language (sections 4 
and 5), that the Mass Noun Thesis as a case of sophisticated othering is rooted 
in a conflation of grammatical and ontological conceptions of mass and count 
nouns that is applicable to the language of the interpreting self but not to the 
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languages of the relevant others (section 5), and that othering in this case is 
driven by a need to create some radically alien other to support a scientific or 
philosophical theory (section 6).
2. CRUDE AND SOPHISTICATED OTHERING
Othering can be loosely defined as the simultaneous construction of the self or 
in-group and the other or out-group in mutual and unequal opposition through 
identification of some desirable characteristic that the self/in-group has and the 
other/out-group lacks and/or some undesirable characteristic that the other/
out-group has and the self/in-group lacks. Othering, in this way, sets up a supe-
rior self/in-group in contrast to an inferior other/out-group, and/or constructs 
the other/out-group as radically alien.
In the paper ‘Othering, an analysis’ (Brons, 2014b), I distinguished two kinds 
of othering based on their underlying logical structure: “crude” and “sophisti-
cated” othering.1 The formal structure of crude othering is rather simple (hence 
the qualification “crude”). There is an assumption, which is usually hidden, that 
it is better to have some property F than to not have that property F; an explicit 
assumption that the self/in-group has this property and the other/out-group 
does not;2 and an implicit, enthymematic conclusion that, therefore, the other/
out-group is inferior and/or radically alien. The ‘and/or’ in the conclusion sug-
gests a complication, but that complication is merely apparent. The two possible 
conclusions are (i) that the self/in-group is superior and the other/out-group 
is inferior, or (ii) that the other/out-group is radically alien. These may seem 
to be monadic properties, but that is not the case. Superiority and inferiority 
are diadic relations: to be superior means to be superior to something, and the 
same for inferiority. And similarly, to be radically alien means to be radically 
alien to/for something (non-alien/familiar). Formally, the difference between 
the two possible conclusions is irrelevant: both can be expressed as the diadic 
relation O(s,o), which can be read as ‘s is superior to o and o is inferior to s’ or 
as ‘o is radically alien to/for s’. (We’ll return to the two kinds of conclusions of 
othering in section 6.) With this in mind, and using s and o to represent self/in-
group and other/out-group, respectively, the formal structure of crude othering 
is the following:
1 The term “sophisticated” has both both positive and negative connotations. Among the 
latter are associations with sophistry. The negative connotations of the term (including the 
link to sophistry) are more appropriate here than the positive ones.
2 Assuming bivalence, Fx ∧ ¬Fy can stand for both x has a certain property and y hasn’t, 
and y has a certain property and x hasn’t. In the latter case F means not having that property. 
Hence, Fx ∧ ¬Fy is sufficient to formalise the criterion of othering that there is “some char-
acteristic that the self/in-group has and the other/out-group lacks and/or some characteristic 
that the other/out-group has and the self/in-group lacks”.
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1. ∀ x,y [(Fx ∧ ¬Fy) → O(x,y)] assumption (usually hidden)
2. Fs ∧ ¬Fo explicit assumption
3. O(s,o) 1, 2 (usually implicit)
Sophisticated othering, on the other hand, is considerably more complicated. 
All three propositions of the crude othering argument also occur at some point 
in the sophisticated othering argument, but there are a few more steps and some 
other complications. As an illustrative example, consider the case of the “Amoral 
Atheists”. Among religious believers the misconception occurs that atheists are 
necessarily amoral.3 The argument underlying this misconception appears to be 
something like the following: (a) moral beliefs are religious beliefs; (b) the other 
has no religious beliefs; therefore (c) the other has no moral beliefs. Premise (a), 
however, results from an invalid generalization of (a*) my/our moral beliefs are 
religious beliefs.
The example illustrates that in case of sophisticated othering an important 
part of the argument is not directly about the other/out-group, but about a spe-
cific kind of objects that are in a specific way related to the self/in-group and 
other/out-group. Formally, this can be represented by means of a single diadic 
relation R(x,y) that, depending on context, means something like ‘x is a be-
lief in the belief system of y’, thus simultaneously specifying the kind of object 
(belief ) and its relation to some social group. The objects specified have fur-
ther properties that are related to each other in a particular way. If these ‘fur-
ther properties’ are represented as A and B, then the interpreter/self holds that 
∀x,y [R(x,y) → (Ax→Bx)] (e.g. ‘all beliefs (in any belief system) that are A are also 
B’). The whole argument has the following formal structure:
1. ∃ x [R(x,s) ∧ Ax] observation
2. ∀ x [R(x,s) → (Ax→Bx)] observation (a*)
3. ∀ x,y [R(x,y) → (Ax→Bx)] 2, generalization (invalid!) (a)
4. ∀ x [Fx ↔ ∃ y [R(y,x) ∧ Ay]] definition or assumption
5. Fs 4, 1
6. ∀ x,y [(Fx ∧ ¬Fy) → O(x,y)] assumption
7. ∀ x [R(x,o) → ¬Bx] observation (b)
8. ∀ x [R(x,o) → ¬Ax] 3, 7 (c)
9. ¬Fo 4, 8
10. O(s,o) 6, 5 and 9
3 The misconception seems to be rather common, in fact, although its prevalence differs 
widely between countries and seems to be related to education as well as other factors. See, for 
example, Pew Research Center, 2014.
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which can be interpreted as follows in the case of the Amoral Atheists:
1. There are moral beliefs in the self/in-group’s belief system.
2. All moral beliefs in the self/in-group’s belief system are religious be-
liefs.
3. All moral beliefs are religious beliefs.
4. Being moral means (or is defined as) having moral beliefs. (Or more 
formally: Someone is moral if and only if she has moral beliefs.)
5. The self/in-group is moral.
6. Being moral is superior to not being moral (i.e. to being amoral).
7. There are no religious beliefs in the other/out-group’s belief system.
8. The other/out-group has no moral beliefs.
9. The other/out-group is not moral.
10. The self/in-group is superior to the other/out-group.
What crude and sophisticated othering have in common are their assump-
tion ∀x,y [(Fx ∧ ¬Fy) → O(x,y)] and their conclusion O(s,o). Without that 
conclusion there is no case of othering (and of course, without hat assumption 
there is no such conclusion). Othering is the attribution of relative inferiority 
and/or radical alienness to some other/out-group. What differs between the 
two  variants of othering is just the argument leading to that conclusion. The 
difference in arguments, however, implies a difference in the ways of exposing 
and countering othering. Crude othering is based on a valid argument, and thus 
the full weight of the conclusion rests on the two premises. In sophisticated 
othering, on the other hand, there is an obvious fallacy, the invalid step from (2) 
to (3), but this becomes obvious only after analysis of the argument underlying 
a particular case of suspected othering. Furthermore, that (3) is not validly in-
ferred does not imply that it is false (that assumption would be a fallacy fallacy) 
— its falsehood needs to be shown separately. And it may be the case that one 
or more premises are dubious or false as well. (In case of the Amoral Atheists, 
the latter does not seem to be the case, however.)
3. THE MASS NOUN THESIS
The “Mass Noun Thesis” is the name given to a number of theories according 
to which all nouns in certain languages are grammatically and folk-ontologically 
similar to mass nouns in English (or another dialect of Standard Average Eu-
ropean). Willard Van Orman Quine (1968) made a suggestion of this nature 
about Japanese in his argument about the indeterminacy of translation; Chad 
Hansen (1983) developed a famous version of the Thesis for classical Chinese, 
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and John Lucy (1992b) for Yucatec Maya; but the Mass Noun Thesis has also 
been applied to modern Chinese, to Korean, and to some other Middle and 
South-American languages besides Maya. What these languages have in com-
mon is a lack of plurals and articles, and a numeral classifier system,4 resulting 
in the appearance that all nouns in those languages are similar to English mass 
nouns (and/or to collective nouns such as “cattle” and “luggage”, but the distinc-
tion between mass nouns and collective nouns is rarely made in the literature on 
the Mass Noun Thesis).5
Arguments in favor of the Mass Noun Thesis typically depend on the identi-
fication of numeral classifiers with individuators (sometimes called quantifiers 
or mensural classifiers) such as “cup” in “a cup of water”. Most languages have 
some form of noun classification. European and African languages typically 
have genders or similar noun classes, but many other languages use classifiers, 
morphemes (usually affixes) that specify the class to which the head noun in 
the noun phrase belongs. The line between noun classes and classifiers is thin, 
however, and between different kinds of classifier systems as well, and one form 
of noun classification can develop into another (Aikhenvald, 2000). 
Noun classifiers are affixed either to the nouns themselves, in which case 
they are somewhat similar to gender-specific (or class-specific) noun endings 
occurring in some languages (e.g. Latin ~a and ~us), or to other sentence ele-
ments satisfying some kind of requirement of grammatical agreement of that 
sentence element with the class(-ification) of the noun to which it refers. Such 
agreeing classifiers can be affixed to either numerals, possessives, verbs, locatives, 
or deictics, but the first — that is, numeral classifiers — are the most common. 
For example, in Japanese, ‘five cows’, the example used by Quine, is either ushi 
go-tou 牛五頭 or go-tou-no ushi 五頭の牛. Ushi 牛 means cow, go 五 is the 
number 5, tou 頭 is the numeral classifier for large non-human mammals, and 
no の is a relational suffix or particle changing the preceding noun phrase into 
a subordinate phrase modifying the following noun (often similar to a genitive, 
but the particle has many other uses). 
As a word rather than as a numeral classifier, 頭 means head, and like 頭, the 
Chinese characters used for most other numeral classifiers have independent 
meanings as well. Consequently, 牛五頭 could be alternatively transcribed as 
(a) ‘cow five-num.cl’ or as (b) ‘cow five head’; and 五頭の牛 as (c) ‘five-num.
cl-mod. cow’, as (d) ‘five head-mod. cow’, or as (e) ‘five head’s cow’ (if の is 
read as a genitive). The transcriptions with ‘head’ (b, d and e) are very similar to 
English ‘five heads of cattle’, suggesting a mass noun interpretation of the noun 
牛 (cow). 
4 In classical Chinese, numeral classifiers were not commonly used before the end of the 
Han era, however, and Yucatec Maya has optional plural marking.
5 Mou (1999) is one of the very few exceptions.
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In English and similar languages, there are two kinds of nouns: mass nouns 
and count nouns. The latter have articles and plurals, and can be counted di-
rectly; the former lack articles and plurals, and need individuators for counting. 
In numeral classifier languages all nouns are like Japanese 牛 (cow) in the exam-
ple above. Hence, all nouns have the typical features of mass nouns in English. 
Therefore, so it is argued, they essentially are mass nouns. And because mass 
nouns denote stuffs rather than discrete objects, people speaking a language 
with only mass nouns must have a folk-ontology of masses or stuffs rather than 
objects; that is, they think in terms of stuffs or materials rather than in terms of 
things or objects (and stuffs only additionally). Lucy made such an argument, 
based on fieldwork, about Yucatec Maya; Hansen used a similar argument to 
explain Gongsun Long’s (公孫龍) apparently paradoxical Discourse on white 
horse (白馬論); and Quine suggested this as a possible interpretation of the 
example phrase used above.
4. FORMAL STRUCTURE OF THE ARGUMENT 
FOR THE MASS NOUN THESIS
In summary, the argument underlying the Mass Noun Thesis is the following: 
(a) count nouns refer to discrete objects and mass nouns to stuffs; (b) the other’s 
language has only mass nouns and thus no count nouns; therefore (c) the other’s 
folk-ontology is an ontology of stuffs only (rather than of discrete objects and 
stuffs). This argument is identical in form to the example of the Amoral Atheists, 
and like that argument, it is accurately paraphrased in the ten steps formalised in 
section 2. By implication (as the type of argument is determined by form alone), 
the Mass Noun Thesis is another example of sophisticated othering.
In case of the Mass Noun Thesis, the predicate letters in the ten-step formali-
zation have the following interpretations:
R(x,y) — x is a word in the language of y
Ax — x refers to discrete objects
Bx — x is a count noun
Fx — x has a folk-ontology of discrete objects; hereafter “object ontology”
O(x,y) — y is radically alien to/for x
Because it is assumed that all nouns are either count nouns or mass nouns, 
and that a folk-ontology is either an object ontology or an ontology of stuffs, 
the negations of Bx and Fx can be read alternatively as:
¬Bx — x is a mass noun
¬Fx — x has a folk-ontology of masses or stuffs; hereafter “mass stuff ontology”
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The distinction between a mass stuff ontology and an object ontology can be 
stronger or weaker and symmetrical or asymmetrical, at least in principle. In the 
strongest version, someone with a mass stuff ontology perceives mass stuffs only. 
Because an object ontology is attributed to an interpreter/self or in-group that 
does discern mass stuffs in addition to discrete objects while symmetry would 
imply that someone with an object ontology perceives discrete objects only, such 
a strong version needs to be asymmetrical. Hence, an object ontology is a folk-
ontology of discrete objects primarily and stuffs secondarily, but including both, 
while a mass stuff ontology is a folk-ontology of stuffs only. Weaker versions 
can be symmetrical, on the other hand. In the weakest version, the difference 
is merely a difference in default: someone with an object ontology by default 
perceives everything to consist of discrete objects, but can divert to a mass stuff 
interpretation in cases where an object interpretation is (more or less obviously) 
implausible (and the other way around for a mass stuff ontology). Anything 
weaker than this cannot reasonably be called an ontological difference. Various 
intermediary positions between these strongest and weakest poles are conceiv-
able. The Mass Noun Thesis, however, is at or close to the stronger end of the 
spectrum. (See section 6 for an explanation for why this is the case.)
With these interpretations of the predicate letters, the formal argument (see 
section 2) can be read as:
1. There are words in the self/in-group’s language that refer to discrete 
objects.
2. All words in the self/in-group’s language that refer to discrete objects 
are count nouns.
3. All words that refer to discrete objects are count nouns. [From 2; in-
valid.]
4. Someone has an object ontology if and only if her language includes 
words that refer to discrete objects.
5. The self/in-group has an object ontology. [From 4 and 1.]
6. Not having an object ontology makes one radically alien.
7. The (language of the) other/out-group has (only mass nouns and there-
fore) no count nouns.
8. The other/out-group has no words that refer to discrete objects. [From 
3 and 7.]
9. The other/out-group does not have an object ontology (and therefore 
has a mass stuff ontology). [From 4 and 8.]
10. The other/out-group is radically alien. [From 6, 5, and 9.]
Observations (1) and (2) seem unobjectionable, but whether (4) and (6) are 
plausible depends on the strength of the distinction between a mass stuff ontol-
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ogy and an object ontology. In case of a weak version of that distinction, such as 
a mere difference in defaults, there is no reason why mass stuff ontologies would 
imply a lack of words that refer to discrete objects (that assumption only makes 
sense in case of a very strong version of the distinction), and therefore, (4) would 
be insufficient to define an object ontology. For weaker versions, (6) would be 
very implausible as well: a mere difference in defaults does not imply radical 
alienness. However, if we accept the very strong distinction between a mass stuff 
ontology and an object ontology assumed by the Mass Noun Thesis, then both 
(4) and (6) are plausible. Someone with such a radically different folk-ontology 
would be radically alien indeed.
If we let (6) pass, then the othering-constituting conclusion (10) depends on 
the conjunction of (5) and (9). Because (1) and (4) were granted, (5) is accept-
able as well, but there is evidence against (9). If (9) is false, then that must mean 
that (8) is false, and that in turn means that (3) and/or (7) are false. After briefly 
considering the plausibility of the intermediate conclusion (9) in the remainder 
of this section, section 5 will discuss the understanding of mass nouns and count 
nouns that is partially represented by (3), and that determines form and content 
of observation (7) as well as the distinction between a mass stuff ontology and 
an object ontology. After exposing the flaws in the argument, the focus shifts to 
what motivates othering in section 6.
As mentioned in section 4, Lucy’s and Hansen’s versions of the Mass Noun 
Thesis were based on fieldwork about Yucatec Maya and an interpretation of 
Gongsun Long’s Discourse on white horse respectively. Hansen’s interpretation 
of the “White Horse Paradox” is controversial, however (e.g. Cheng, 2007), 
and Reiko Mazuka and Ronald S. Friedman (2000) argue convincingly that 
Lucy’s findings of differences in classification of objects and stuffs by speakers 
of Yucatec Maya and English may be the result of differences in educational and 
cultural background rather than language, and could not replicate his findings 
for Japanese, which is grammatically similar to Yucatec Maya in the relevant 
respects. Furthermore, there have been many publications on the mass — count 
distinction and its folk-ontological effect for Japanese since the second half of 
the 1990s. Many of these studies focus on classification of samples as objects or 
stuffs by children with different native languages. Contradicting the Mass Noun 
Thesis, intermediate conclusion (9) in particular, findings suggest a universal 
ontological distinction between objects and stuffs (e.g. Imai & Gentner, 1997; 
Yoshida & Smith, 2003; Imai & Mazuka, 2006; Imai & Saalbach, 2010).
There is some evidence, however, that the structure of their language influ-
ences children’s classification of ambiguous cases (e.g. Imai & Gentner, 1997). 
These tend to be more often classified as objects by speakers of English, and 
more often as stuffs by speakers of Japanese. This should not be interpreted as 
support for the weak version of the distinction between a mass stuff ontology 
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and an object ontology as a difference in defaults, however. A mass stuff default 
means perceiving things a mass stuff unless such a perception is implausible, but 
there is no empirical evidence for such defaults. Rather, unambiguously discrete 
objects are perceived as such, unambiguous mass stuffs are perceived as such, 
and only in ambiguous cases (in between) does language have some influence. 
Hence, there is no difference in folk-ontology, but merely a minor difference of 
perception of borderline cases (similar to, for example, different locations of the 
blue/green boundary for different people who make that colour distinction).
Furthermore, intermediate conclusion (9) seems to be a gross violation of the 
principle of charity, at least in Quine’s own interpretation thereof, summarised 
at one point as “assertions [about the other] startlingly false on the face of them 
are likely to turn on hidden differences of language” (Quine, 1960: 59). (9) is 
not just startlingly false; it is startlingly absurd. It implies (given the Mass Noun 
Thesis’s strong version of the object/mass ontology distinction) the conceptual 
priority of stuffs or masses to individual chunks or parts thereof. It implies that 
an infant, just because its parents speak a numeral classifier language, would 
learn a concept of mother-mass before learning to individuate its own mother as 
a part thereof. Considering the implausibility of this scenario, it does not come 
as a surprise that the empirical evidence shows that (9) is false, but this raises 
a number of questions — most obviously: Where exactly does the argument 
derail (if it ever was on track)? But also: Why did Quine and others propose 
and/or defend a version of the Mass Noun Thesis, despite its implausible and 
uncharitable attribution of a mass stuffs ontology to others? Answering these 
two questions is the aim of the following two sections.
5. MASS NOUNS, COUNT NOUNS, 
AND NUMERAL CLASSIFIERS
If the intermediate conclusion (9) that the other/out-group has a mass stuff on-
tology is false, then that implies (indirectly, see above) that either the generalised 
assumption (3) that all words that refer to discrete objects are count nouns, or 
observation (7) that the (language of the) other/out-group has only mass nouns 
and therefore no count nouns is false, or both.
The concise Oxford dictionary of linguistics (Matthews, 2007) defines mass 
nouns and count nouns as being uncountable and countable, respectively. Mass 
nouns are strictly speaking uncountable indeed, given that in individuator con-
structions like ‘three cups of water’, cups are counted and not water itself. As 
mentioned in section 3, observation (7) that the other’s language has only mass 
nouns is based primarily on an identification of numeral classifiers with indi-
viduators such as “cup” in ‘three cups of water’ or “head” in ‘five heads of cattle’. 
There are two reasons to reject this identification, however.
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Firstly, English individuator constructions have the form:
[numeral] [individuator noun] of [mass or collective noun].
Hypothetically, this could be reordered into a more odd-sounding genitive 
construction:
[mass or collective noun]-gen (’s) [numeral] [individuator noun],
which appears to be very similar to a numeral classifier construction like go-
tou-no ushi 五頭の牛 (‘five cows’; see section 3), but this appearance is false. 
A numeral classifier construction is not a genitive construction. Even if の 
would be read as a genitive in 五頭の牛, and 頭 as “head” rather than as nu-
meral classifier, then the literal translation would be ‘cow of five heads’, and not 
‘five heads of cow/cattle’. More importantly, in the English phrase (either in the 
version with “of ” or the genitive version) the individuator noun (“cup”, “head”, 
etc.) rather than the individuated mass or collective noun (“water”, “cattle”, etc.) 
is the head noun. In ‘five heads of cattle’, “five heads” becomes the grammati-
cal focal point of the noun phrase and “of cattle” is mere modifier thereof, but 
in the numeral classifier construction it is the other way around: 五頭 (five, 
head) is mere adjective-like modification (a kind of number-neutral or plural 
predication, specifically), and 牛 (cow) remains the head noun. This is further 
demonstrated by the fact that the head noun takes the appropriate case suffix in 
a sentence. In the following example it is the noun 牛 that takes the object case 
suffix/particle o を, not 頭:
虎が牛を五頭食べた。
Tora-ga ushi-o go-tou tabe-ta.
tiger-subject cow-object five-num.cl eat-past.t
A/the/some tiger(s) ate five cows.
Secondly, the assumption that 頭 in 牛五頭 is an individuator noun like 
“head” in ‘five heads of cattle’ begs the question. An alternative — and more 
plausible — interpretation is that it is not a noun at all, but mere suffix, a suffix 
for class agreement of numerals with the quantified noun similar to inflection 
for gender of some numerals in Icelandic, Polish, or French.6 Individuator nouns 
are independent lexical items with meanings of their own. In most cases numeral 
classifiers have no independent semantic value, however, even though they may 
be phonologically and/or graphically identical to words/characters that do have 
independent meaning. Furthermore, while the choice of individuator nouns is 
6 This implies, of course, that the same Chinese character has different grammatical func-
tions in different contexts, but that is the case for very many characters.
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open, usually the choice of numeral classifier is obligatory. Large non-human 
mammals have to be counted with tou 頭, cars and mechanical devices with dai 
台 (as noun: platform, stand, etc.), long thin things with hon 本 (as noun: origin, 
book), flat things with mai 枚 (as noun originally stalk, shrub, trunk, but now 
only used as classifier), and so forth.7
Nouns do not necessarily have to be assigned to a single class, however. In 
gender systems class assignments are often rigid, but many French male and 
female versions of animal names can easily be argued to be the same lexical 
items with two different possible class (gender) assignments with correspond-
ing articles and endings (the latter only for the female variants). And many 
Bantu languages allow for insults and word play by reassigning a noun to a class 
it does not normally belong to. In classifications with larger numbers of classes 
the same noun can belong to different classes, and the choice of numeral classi-
fier depends on what aspect of the corresponding thing is contextually salient, 
or in case of ambiguity, on what aspect needs to be stressed. For example, ika 
ip-piki 烏賊一匹 is one living squid and ika ip-pai 烏賊一杯 is one squid as 
food because hiki 匹 is the numeral classifier of (most) small animals, and hai 杯 
of cups of something (usually food or drink) and of a few foods that in certain 
conditions have a cup-like shape. And similarly, tegami san-tsuu 手紙三通 is 
‘three letters’ and tegami san-mai 手紙三枚 is ‘a three-page letter’ because tsuu 
通 is the numeral classifier of communications and mai 枚 of flat things such as 
sheets of paper. These examples also show that some numeral classifiers in some 
circumstances can be or are used as individuators (the first example for ‘cups of ’, 
the second for ‘sheets of ’), perhaps adding to the confusion. In case of liquids, 
the aforementioned numeral classifier for long thin things hon 本 takes on the 
meaning of ‘bottle’, and thus biiru juu-hon ビール十本 is ‘ten bottles of beer’. 
The limited flexibility of a numeral classifier system is sufficient for it to also 
function as a system to individuate in mass stuffs.8 However, this occasional use 
7 These examples of numeral classifiers also illustrate that in many cases the literal meaning 
of the Chinese character is irrelevant to its use as a classifier, which is never the case for indi-
viduator nouns. The meaning of the word “bucket” in reference to a quantity of something 
is very closely related to its meaning in reference to an object: it is from the use of buckets as 
containers that “bucket” derives its use as a measuring/individuating device. This is not the 
case for 本, for example, which means book or origin when used a noun, and is additionally 
used to count long things. Those two uses are — at least in contemporary language use — 
completely unrelated.
8 In such cases, numeral classifiers do not actually classify, however, which could be an ar-
gument for the claim that so called numeral classifier languages have both numeral classifiers 
and individuators, which happen to make use of the same grammar, but which are used for 
count nouns and mass nouns, respectively. This claim would attribute a count noun vs. mass 
noun distinction to Japanese, albeit not the exact same distinction as in English, and therefore, 
would slightly change the argument in this section of this paper by directly refuting (7), but 
would not alter its conclusions.
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as a mass individuation device does not imply grammatical identity to another, 
superficially similar mass individuation device in another language.
If numeral classifiers are not individuators, does that mean that Japanese and 
similar languages (in this respect) have no mass nouns, and therefore, only count 
nouns? If count nouns are defined as being (directly) countable, then the answer 
to this question seems to be ‘yes’. Mass nouns are uncountable — what is counted 
in an individuator construction is the individuator noun, which becomes the 
head noun in the noun phrase. Count nouns, on the other hand, can be counted 
directly, and adding a numeral, therefore, does not change the head noun in the 
noun phrase. The latter is also true for all nouns in Japanese: adding a numeral 
does not change the head noun. Unlike individuator nouns, numeral classifiers 
do not become head nouns (and thus do not take case affixes), and partially for 
that reason they are more plausibly interpreted as not being nouns at all, but as 
affixes of class agreement.
Substituting the thesis that the other’s language has count nouns only for ob-
servation (7) that it has mass nouns only results in the hypothetical Count Noun 
Thesis, which — to my knowledge — has been held by no one. The short version 
of the thus revised argument (see section 4 for the Mass Noun version) would be 
the following: (a) count nouns refer to discrete objects and mass nouns to stuffs; 
(b) the other’s language has only count nouns and thus no mass nouns; therefore 
(c) the other’s folk-ontology is an ontology of discrete objects only (rather than 
of discrete objects and stuffs). An adherent to a folk-ontology lacking mass stuffs 
would, however, be committed to the belief that stuffs are inherently divided 
into discrete “chunks”, but such a belief cannot be attributed to the others of the 
Mass Noun Thesis or its Count Noun variant. The fact that the choice of classi-
fier, and therefore the size of chunks, is more or less free in case of stuffs means 
that there are no inherent discrete chunks. Therefore, the Count Noun Thesis 
is false, but it is false for the same reason as the Mass Noun Thesis.
Both the Count Noun Thesis and the Mass Noun Thesis attribute single-
category folk-ontologies to the other: only discrete objects in case of the former; 
only mass stuffs in case of the latter. (This, of course, presupposes the strong 
distinction between object and mass stuff ontologies. See section 4.) Either at-
tribution is false. Rather, the distinction between discrete objects and mass stuffs 
is most likely universal and independent of language (Imai & Gentner, 1997; see 
also section 4). But if that is the case, then there must be another error in the ar-
guments for the two Theses. The most obvious candidate for error is the invalid 
generalization (3) that all words that refer to discrete objects are count nouns. 
Invalidity does not entail falsehood, however, and (3) could be interpreted as 
a definition rather than an empirical claim. If it is, then it would compete with 
the definition of count nouns a being countable; that is, there would effectively 
be two definitions of “count noun”, one grammatical and one ontological. In 
that case, the argument would be based on a fallacy of equivocation as (3) is the 
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ontological definition and (7) depends on the definitions of count nouns and 
mass nouns as being countable and uncountable, and thus on the grammatical 
definition. In other words, different parts of the argument make use of different 
senses of “count noun”.
Furthermore, this equivocation cannot be removed. Discarding either defini-
tion or combining them into a single definition (‘count nouns refer to discrete 
objects and are countable’) leads to elimination of either (3) or (7), in which 
case the argument never reaches its conclusions (9) and (10). The only apparent 
alternative is showing equivalence of the two definitions, but that is impossible. 
According to the ontological definition, a noun is a count noun if and only if 
there is some discrete object in extra-linguistic reality (regardless of how that is 
conceived) that that noun refers to (or denotes, etc.). According to the grammati-
cal definition, a noun is a count noun if and only if there is a grammatical rule in 
the language it is part of specifying that it can be directly counted. The defini-
entia of these two definitions are about completely different kinds of things. 
There is no sound argument that would make these two definitions equivalent. 
Even if they would be co-extensional, they would not be equivalent. However, 
they don’t seem to be co-extensional even. Equivalence of the two definientia 
would entail that all and only nouns that refer to discrete objects are countable, 
which is contradicted by Japanese if the above analysis of numeral classifiers is 
right, but also by many Nilo-Saharan languages in which oil, sand, and water are 
countable (Dimmendaal, 2000).
Consequently, (3) cannot be reasonably interpreted as a definition, which 
means that it must be an empirical claim. The claim that all words that refer to 
discrete objects are count nouns — by definition of count nouns as countable — 
is then equivalent to: (3’’) all nouns that refer to discrete objects are countable. 
(3’) may very well be true, but isn’t very helpful if it is not sufficiently clear what 
“countable” means. (3) is used to infer (8) that the other’s language does not have 
words that refer to discrete objects from observation (7) or (7’) that that there 
are no countable nouns in the other’s language (from (7), by definition of count 
nouns as countable). Plausible interpretations of “countable” and its negation 
make (7’) implausible, however, as is illustrated by the above analysis of numeral 
classifiers in Japanese. 
Thus far, being uncountable, the defining feature of mass nouns, has been 
interpreted as meaning not being countable directly but requiring an individu-
ator, but a possible alternative conception is lacking a plural. Many linguists 
belief that number marking, of which plural marking is an example, is related 
to numeral classifiers (and thus to individuators) such that a language either 
has a well-developed system of number marking or a numeral classifier system 
(e.g. Sanches & Slobin, 1973; Chierchia, 1998). However, The Universals Ar-
chive lists a number of exceptions to this supposed rule,9 and even if there would 
9 Retrived from http://typo.uni-konstanz.de/archive/ Entry #533. See also #1349.
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be no known exceptions today, there is no reason to assume that the less than 
5% of present and historical human languages that we hypothetically have access 
to is a representative sample of all possible linguistic variation (Brons, 2014a). 
Furthermore, whether lacking plurals in itself can be the defining feature of 
mass nouns is doubtful. Would that imply that “sheep” is a mass noun? (This 
question may sound more facetious than it is intended, as will become clear in 
the following.)
Languages deal with number in a variety of ways. In some, such as Japanese, 
all nouns are number neutral (and perhaps, so is “sheep” in English); others mark 
different numbers by means of affixes, but such number marking can take many 
different forms. Singular/plural is the best known, but singular/dual/plural and 
singular/plural/collective also occur (in Sanskrit and Maasai, respectively, for 
example). More “exotic” than these are the number marking systems of Imonda 
and Udege. The former has an unmarked >2-plural and a marked singular=dual 
(Seiler, 1985). Hence, one and two are grouped together and contrasted to 
larger-than-two. Udege also has the common marked/unmarked contrast, but 
unmarked means that the number is specified and marked that it is unspeci-
fied. When a numeral or other quantifier is used or the number is obviously 
one, then the noun is unmarked; otherwise, that is, when the noun is not obvi-
ously singular and no numeral or other quantifier is used, the noun is marked 
(Nikolaeva & Tolskaya, 2001). Hence, neither Imonda nor Udege has singulars 
and plurals in a strict sense,10 but their number marking systems do not suggest 
that all Imonda or Udege nouns are mass nouns either. The reason that (some) 
number neutral languages do suggest a mass noun interpretation, on the other 
hand, is not their lack of plurals, but their numeral classifiers. Lacking the latter, 
counting in those languages would be like counting “sheep”, but it looks more 
like counting “cattle”. That appearance — so I hope to have shown above — is 
deceptive, however; despite appearance to the contrary, it is more like counting 
“sheep” than like counting “cattle” (but like counting male and female sheep with 
gender-agreeing affixes on numerals similar to the inflection for gender of some 
numerals in Icelandic or Polish).
Regardless of whether (3) is a definition or an empirical claim, it is based on 
observation (2) that all words that refer to discrete objects in the interpreter/
in-group’s language are count nouns. This is typical of sophisticated othering 
(see section 2). Otherness is constructed through an interpretation of the other 
in terms derived from, and applicable to the interpreting self. The conclusions 
of the argument depend on a distinction of count nouns and mass nouns as typi-
cally found in the interpreter’s language. Grammatical and ontological aspects 
of this distinction are conflated because they are inseparable in the interpreter’s 
10 Irina Nikolaeva and Maria Tolskaya (2001) call the unmarked form ‘singular’ and the 
marked form ‘plural’, but that is reflective more of the conceptual dominance of the singular/
plural paradigm than of Udege grammar.
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language. But it is only by seeing the other too much in her own terms that 
the interpreter/self constructs the other’s otherness. Number neutrality plus 
numeral classifiers — seen through the lens of the interpreter’s own language 
— means mass nouns plus individuators, but a closer look would teach her that 
number neutrality is more like counting “sheep”, and numeral classifiers are just 
that: classifiers, not individuators. The question that remains to be answered, is: 
What prevented this closer look?
6. NEEDING THE OTHER
Othering is often connected to psychological mechanisms of separating self or 
in-group from the (or some) other or out-group. In a psychological study of 
 othering, Alex Gillespie wrote that there is much evidence for “a widespread ten-
dency to differentiate in-group from out-group and Self from Other in such a way 
as to bolster and protect Self ” (Gillespie, 2007: 580). People have a tendency to 
create positive self-concepts and positive concepts of the in-groups they belong 
to in contrast to more negative images of others and out-groups. This process is 
driven by a psychological need of self-affirmation (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1979; 
Hogg & Abrams, 1990; Sherman & Cohen, 2006; see also Gillespie, 2007; 
Brons, 2014b). However, while the self-affirmatory construction of a superior 
self/in-group versus an inferior other/out-group may be the most common (and 
best known) motivation for othering, it is not necessarily the only one. Othering 
creates a radical separation between self/in-group and other/out-group, a bound-
ary that makes the other/out-group clearly, significantly, and essentially other. 
Such a boundary may serve a psychological need of self-affirmation, but there are 
other reasons why an interpreter/self might want or “need” a radically alien other. 
(The existence of different needs or motivations for othering was recognized in 
the formal approach of section 2. See also Brons, 2014b.)
By attributing a radically different folk-ontology to the other, the Mass Noun 
Thesis constructs an essential boundary between self/in-group and other/out-
group, which makes it a case of othering, but neither Quine, nor Hansen or Lucy 
can be plausibly accused of being driven by a need to distinguish a superior self/
in-group from an inferior other/out-group.11 Rather, in these three examples of 
the Mass Noun Thesis, there is a theoretical need for a radically alien other; that 
is, the radically alien other serves as “evidence” for some theoretical point.
Quine (1968) used the example of Japanese numerals as an illustration of the 
indeterminacy of translation, in pointing out that there are or may be cases in 
11A variant of the Mass Noun Thesis that comes very close to the superiority/inferiority-
constructing kind of othering is Gennaro Chierchia’s (1998). At least, Chierchia leaves that 
impression by comparing Chinese to early child grammar, by ranking languages with Chinese 
at the lowest and Germanic/Slavic at the highest level, and by his concluding statement that 
the latter are closer to ‘virtual perfection’. 
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which based on all available evidence no choice can be made between different 
alternative translations of the same language fragment. Go-tou-no ushi  五頭の牛 
may be ‘five cows’ or ‘five heads of cattle’, attributing either an object ontology 
or a mass stuff ontology to speakers of Japanese. The Japanese philosopher Iida 
responded: 
When I read this passage a long time ago, my first reaction was that of disbelief. Of course, 
Professor Quine is not suggesting that we should construe a Japanese noun ushi as a mass 
term; he is only pointing out a possibility of so construing (Iida, 1998: 113). 
It is indeed merely that possibility of so construing that Quine needed. To 
illustrate his theory of the indeterminacy of translation, Quine needed the theo-
retical possibility of a language that cuts up the world in a radically different way: 
he needed the theoretical possibility of a radically alien other.
Hansen’s (1983) version of the Mass Noun Thesis should be located in the 
broader context of his argument that “contrastive analysis must replace compara-
tive analysis in comparative philosophy” (Hansen, 1972: 169) because of “the 
fundamentally contrasting nature of Chinese intellectual activity” (Hansen, 
1985: 494). In Hansen’s opinion, the ancient Chinese way of thinking is so 
different that this precludes any kind of meaningful comparison — contrastive 
analysis is all that is possible. The Mass Noun Thesis is one of his arguments in 
constructing the ancient Chinese as radically alien (see also Roetz, 1993). 
Lucy’s version of the Mass Noun Thesis for Yucatec Maya (Lucy, 1992b) was 
published simultaneously with his reformulation and defense of the Sapir-Whorf 
Thesis (Lucy, 1992a), the idea that the languages we speak strongly influence or 
even determine the way we think (and our folk-ontologies are part of the way 
we think). Ever since, Lucy has been one of the main defenders of that thesis, 
and the Mass Noun Thesis is his strongest “evidence”.
In these three cases of the Mass Noun Thesis, what motivates othering is 
a need to (empirically) support a theory in which the author heavily invested 
intellectually. All three needed the other to be radically alien to proof or support 
a theoretical point. It is for this reason that the Mass Noun Thesis is based on 
a very strong distinction between an object ontology and a mass stuff ontol-
ogy, and by implication, between the self/in-group’s and the other/out-group’s 
folk-ontology (see section 4): only such a strong distinction makes the other 
sufficiently other.
Although the need to support a theory is a different need from the psy-
chological need for self-affirmation (and the related self-superiority vs. other-
inferiority),12 it doesn’t significantly differ in its effects: in either case, the other 
12 On the other hand, successfully supporting one’s own theory seems very self-affirming, 
which suggests that the need to support one’s own theory is not completely unrelated to the 
need for self-affirmation.
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is made to be essentially different from the self/in-group. Regardless of whether 
the other is constructed as radically alien or as inferior, an essential boundary is 
created, but this is a false and artificial boundary, a boundary that separates and 
excludes where sufficient ground for separation or exclusion is lacking. Never-
theless, sophisticated othering — the kind of othering the Mass Noun Thesis is 
an example of — should not be seen as a wholly negative phenomenon. About 
early ethnography, Vidich and Lyman wrote that “the author’s ethnographic 
report is a reversed mirror image of his own ethnocultural ideal”, and that be-
cause of that, “early ethnographies reveal as much about the West as about their 
objects of study” (Vidich & Lyman, 1994: 26). What distinguishes sophisticated 
from crude othering is that the former depends on a perception of the other/
out-group through a lens colored by beliefs about the self/in-group (see section 
2). Othering in case of the Mass Noun Thesis depends on an interpretation of 
the other/out-group’s language(s) in terms that are applicable only to the self/
in-group’s language but that were unconsciously assumed to be universal (see 
section 5). The exposition of othering reveals that the attributed otherness is 
a ‘reversed mirror image’ of the interpreting self, and thus shifts the attention 
from the other/out-group to the interpreter/self/in-group, and this — ideally — 
corrects both the interpretation of the other/out-group and of the self/in-group. 
In this way, through the confrontation with the other, the interpreter also comes 
to better understand herself. To speak with Lao zi (老子), “he who understands 
other people has knowledge; he who understands himself is seeing clearly”,13 but 
the latter turns out to be a prerequisite for the former.
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